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Subject Formation,  Fundamentalism, and Instrumentalist Nationalism                                    
in Zimbabwean Politics 
Joram Tarusarira 
While many have dismissed the notion that President Robert Mugabe’s regime still has 
enthusiastic supporters (Kriger, 2005), this article argues that indeed it does, as shown by the 
effervescence at ZANU PF rallies and other events.  Far more than coercion, rented crowds, 
handouts, and well-articulated election manifestos, the fundamentalist mindset created by 
instrumentalist nationalism is integral to clarifying why this is the case, and further, why some 
Zimbabweans are so susceptible to compliance with power relations that subordinate them 
and have mismanaged the economy, thereby making their lives miserable.  Deploying the 
concept of fundamentalism to analyze instrumentalist nationalism is of fresh conceptual 
value.  It brings a psychosocial lens through which to study nationalism—a topic dominated 
by political economy.  The fundamentalist framework illuminates understandings of the 
workings of beliefs, emotions and attitudes, which are often overlooked in the body politic.  
The concept of fundamentalism has been applied to religious groups, movements, and 
discourses, such that it would be anathema to discuss political discourses within the context of 
fundamentalism.  A critical analysis of the psychological nature of fundamentalism, especially 
its potency to create “apocalyptic” subjects, illuminates understanding on the phenomenon of 
passionate attachment to power that subjects.  ZANU PF instrumentalist nationalist discourse, 
and its vision and version of a Zimbabwe and Africa that President Mugabe was to deliver, 
has become an apocalypse that captivates its followers.  The resonance of the fundamentalist 
mind and instrumentalist nationalism intimates that fundamentalism is a concept transcending 
religious circumscriptions where it has its provenance.  This article interrogates ZANU PF’s 
instrumentalist nationalism through both religious and non-religious lenses such as the 
education system, media, church platforms, music, history and culture, galas, and its usual 
political campaigns.  The argument of this article is not about ZANU PF’s winning or losing 
elections, or necessarily about the numbers of people who attend rallies, but about those 
people who still support it enthusiastically.  The article asks why those who support ZANU 
PF continue to do so passionately and fervently, despite ZANU PF presiding over a failed 
economy, and failing to deliver political goods. 
Fundamentalism and Its Effects 
Though its tenets are contested, some general characteristics of fundamentalism can be 
identified from within the religious discourse.  These include the perception that it is a 
 
 
reaction to secularism, rationalism, and modernity.  However, modernity is accepted where it 
does not contradict some basic religious principles.  Fundamentalism creates boundaries.  It 
has a tendency to form strong identities exclusive of others and thus divide people into them 
and us; it divides people into friends and enemies, good and evil.  It erects boundaries 
between those who are members and those who are not.  These boundaries can be physical, 
but often the barriers are social, psychological, and behavioural, which is why some have 
argued that fundamentalism produces a particular intensity of non-rational or irrational 
passion not subject to the firm control of reason.  Fundamentalists are driven by fervor, rage, 
passion, fanaticism, and zeal—making religious fundamentalism absolutist, self-righteous, 
arrogant, dogmatic, and intolerant of compromise (Cavanaugh, 2009, pp. 18-26).  Members 
try to associate with their own and avoid outsiders as much as is possible.  They may develop 
particular modes of dress, behaviour, speech (Almond, Appleby, & Sivan, 2003; Marty & 
Appleby, 1991) enforced in their communities—sometimes violently (Sprinzak, 1991).  They 
develop their own independent social institutions such as traditional religious institutions, 
schools, community centres, businesses, and burial societies.  They tend to have a black and 
white view of the world.  That is, there is right and wrong, good and evil, insiders and 
outsiders, salvation and damnation.  The boundaries are clear and there is no room for shades 
of grey.  Fundamentalists believe in elect membership, with them as the chosen ones.  
Subsequently, they have exclusive access to truth, and this feeling cements the boundaries 
between them and others.  They believe in the inerrancy of, and focus on, their text.  
Theological innovation is permitted only when a religion in its old format is challenged by 
modernity and is no longer defending the group.  Hence religion’s central tenets and 
ideologies are reinterpreted to meet the present challenges. 
One method of theological innovation is a selective emphasis on doctrines (see 
Bourdieu, 1991).  Fundamentalists tend to focus on a utopian golden age of religion when 
their belief system was allegedly pure and perfect.  There is desire to go back to the mythical 
age of the past.  According to Soloveitchik (1994), “This history filters out untoward facts and 
glosses over the darker aspects of the past.  Indeed, it often portrays events as they did not 
happen” (p. 82).  Fundamentalist leaders have authority over political, economic and personal 
issues, and their opinion is sought and followed in all major decisions of life.  
Fundamentalism is often associated with male-dominated societies where women are 
expected to defer to men.  One of the concerns of fundamentalists is that modernity is 
undermining traditional gender roles (Fox, 2013, pp. 109-115).  
 
 
Fundamentalism creates subjects who espouse a mind, which inter alia, emphasizes 
certainty and the black and white distinction of worldview, and smacks of absolutisms already 
suggested.  This is the point at which subject formation enters.  Absolutist and apocalyptic 
knowledge produce apocalyptic subjects.  Associated with absolutism is the sense of 
uniqueness and finality.  Thus, if particular knowledge is deposited within a people, and it 
determines their existence, it is power.  This is so because people become dependent on that 
knowledge.  Thus, that upon which one depends is considered to have power over him or her.  
No wonder Butler (1997) points out that “power is not simply what we oppose, but also, in a 
strong sense, what we depend on for our existence and what we harbour and preserve in the 
beings that we are” (p. 2).  So when a form of knowledge or information is impressed upon a 
people, an inner life is produced in the process of subject formation through various societal 
institutions.  Subjection produces a radical ambivalence in which the individual emerges 
through a passionate attachment to his or her own subordination (Butler, 1997).  This 
ambivalence is evident in how the subject may find himself or herself loving the oppressor, 
who under normal circumstances would be hated.  The subject has a passionate attachment 
with the oppressor, thus feelings of attraction and resentment are existing simultaneously. 
The Discourse of Instrumentalist Nationalism 
Nationalism is as contested, with various scholars emphasizing different aspects, and 
possesses different implications for its study.  One scholar writes,  
Those who define [nationalism] as an idea will focus on the writings and speeches of 
nationalist intellectuals or activists; those who see it as a sentiment will concentrate on 
the development of language or other shared ways of life and try to see how these 
“folk ways” are taken up by the intelligentsia or the politicians; finally those who treat 
nationalism as a movement will focus on political action and conflict. (Ozikrimli, 
2000, p. 58)  
It is a discourse that constantly shapes our consciousness and the way we constitute the 
meaning of the world.  It determines our collective identity by producing and reproducing us 
as “nationals.”  It is a way of seeing and interpreting that conditions our daily speech, 
behaviors, and attitudes (Ozikrimili, 2000, p. 4).  Its power comes from its capacity to create 
an identity based on emotion and the irrational (Langman, 2006).  It can already be seen that 
nationalism, therefore, has the capacity to produce a fundamentalist mind.  Hence there is a 
significant resonance between the two discourses.  
 
 
In step with theological innovation of fundamentalism, Brass (1991) notes that under 
nationalism, “cultures are fabricated by elites whose aims are ensuring economic or political 
advantages for themselves” (p. 8).  When nationalism becomes an instrument to gain power, it 
becomes instrumentalist nationalism.  According to Hobsbawm (1994), the nation and its 
associated phenomena, including nationalism, the nation-state, national symbols, and histories 
are a result of social engineering, which are often deliberate and always innovative.  He 
created the concept of “invention of traditions” (Hobsbawn, 2004): a set of practices normally 
governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and rituals of a symbolic nature, which inculcate 
certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, thereby automatically implying 
continuity with the past.  All these are efforts for what Foucault (1977) and Althusser (1971) 
call “subjectivation” (subject formation) and “intepellation,” respectively.  Subjectivation is a 
Foucaldian philosophical concept that refers to the construction of an individual subject; it is 
an identity forming process, and nationalism is part of such a process.  According to Foucault, 
the modern era’s forces of disciplinary power and normalization turn individuals into subjects.  
The individual is a result of strategic power relations (Allen, 2009).  “Intepellation” was first 
coined by Louis Althusser to describe the process by which ideology produces the individual 
as a subject through “Ideological State Apparatuses” that include religion, education, the 
family, the law, politics, culture, and the media.  These institutions produce the ideologies 
within which we assume identities and become subjects.  When ideologies and ideology work 
well, they are lived as if they were obvious and natural (Althusser, 1971; Ndlovu-Gathseni 
2009).  Thus, in the case of ZANU PF supporters going to rallies, supporting the party, 
singing and dancing become obvious and natural.  Giddens (1985) refers to nationalism as 
“primarily psychological…the affiliation of individuals to a set of symbols and beliefs 
emphasising communality among the members of a political order” (p. 116).  He proceeds to 
note that sentiments of group identity at all times and all places are exclusionary.  How a 
group is thought of, and how they define themselves, depends upon the traits attributed to 
outsiders.  
Instrumentalist Nationalism and the Zimbabwean State Since the 1990s 
Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980.  The discourse of nationalism soon 
followed.  National unity was the buzz word in the political discourse, such that any move to 
oppose the ruling regime was confronted in the name of nationalism.  The 1982 massacres 
witnessed in the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces exemplified allegations that dissidents 
there threatened national unity (Catholic Commission for Justice & Peace, 1997), and resulted 
in the Unity Accord of 1987, when ZANU  merged with Zimbabwe People’s Union (ZAPU) 
 
 
to form ZANU PF.  This development was based on Mugabe’s advocacy for a one party-
state—a position that was contested by ZANU PF’s former Secretray General, Edgar Tekere 
(1937-2011), who challenged a one-party state as never one of the founding principles of 
ZANU-PF, and further argued that experience in Africa had shown a one-party state brought 
the evils of nepotism, corruption,and inefficiency (Masunungure, 2004, p. 159).  Tekere went 
on to form his own party called the Zimbabwe Unity Movement.  When the 1990 elections, 
according to the electoral commission, presented a loss for Tekere, he faded out of public 
view and was later alleged to have reconciled with ZANU PF.  When he died he was buried at 
the national heroes acre, a space reserved only for Mugabe’s trusted cadres from the liberation 
struggle.   
ZANU PF encountered an unprecedented electoral challenge by a new political party, 
the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which emerged in 1999.  Faced with this 
challenge,  ZANU PF tilted the goal of nationalism from a focus on national unity to regime 
security.  Nationalism became an instrument for keeping ZANU PF in power.  Deliberate 
strategies were deployed for this purpose, such as the media, religious institutions, musical 
galas, education, youth (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009).  The MDC gained popularity, due to ZANU 
PF’s socio-economic and political mismanagement in the 1990s (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009).  
Faced with an electorate that had lost trust, ZANU PF resorted to instrumentalist nationalism 
to stay in power.  
In the 1990s, Zimbabwe experienced a declining economy against the global economic 
liberalization, which prompted it to adopt the Economic Structural Adjustment Program 
(ESAP) from international financial institutions.  Unfortunately the program resulted in the 
negative effects of deceleration of economic growth, employment decreases, high inflation, 
and other issues (Kanyenze, 2004).  Its social impact included increased suffering of the 
ordinary person, loss of jobs, reduced incomes, and the crumbling of social services.  This 
prompted the citizens to be disillusioned with the government.  The decline of workers’ 
incomes led to a series of nationwide strikes by the labor movement, represented by the 
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), between 1996 and 1998 (Kanyenze, 2004).  
The ZCTU was a key member of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), a new 
umbrella body of non-governmental organizations, that located the Zimbabweans’ crisis 
within the constitution.  Out of the NCA was born the MDC in 1999. 
As previously pointed out, fundamentalists develop their own independent social 
institutions, such as traditional religious institutions, schools, community centers, businesses, 
or burial societies.  ZANU PF did not establish its own institutions per se, but usurped those 
 
 
of the state to defend itself from the threat of the MDC.  A National Youth training scheme 
was launched in August 2001 (allegedly) to teach the youth patriotism, unity and oneness, 
national identity, discipline and self-reliance (Smith, 2005).  In actual fact, they were 
indoctrinated with exclusively ZANU-PF campaign materials and speeches, including an 
anthology of Mugabe’s speeches titled Inside the Third Chimurenga (liberation struggle).  
The system used crude propaganda, violence, and intimidation to manipulate youth into 
thinking that their own impunity and abuse of power was part of the struggle to protect 
ZANU-PF and Zimbabwe from foreign influence (Smith, 2005).  The youth became in 
Foucauldian terms (Foucault, 1977, p. 138) a machinery of power—docile bodies compelled 
to operate under the techniques, speed and efficiency the regime wished.  Interviewed youth 
members revealed:  
Our source of power was this encouragement we were getting, particularly from the 
police and others…it was instilled in us that whenever we go out, we are free to do 
whatever we want and nobody was going to question that. (Solidarity Peace Trust, 
2003) [italics my own] 
In endorsing the same report of Solidarity Peace Trust (2003), the church leaders of southern 
Africa lamented:  
Having been thoroughly brain-washed, the youth militias are deployed to carry out 
whatever instructions they receive from their political commissars, on the 
understanding that they will never be called to account by this regime for any of their 
deeds. (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2003) [italics my own] 
A National and Strategic Studies Program was introduced in Teacher’s and Technical 
colleges, purportedly to foster a desire to participate in national development and equip the 
students with the relevant skills (Ministries of Education Sports & Culture & Higher 
Education, 2004).  To the contrary, the course was fundamentalist, devoid of objective and 
critical thinking, lacking the ability for students to question things or reason for themselves.  
Reports have indicated that the militia became one of the most commonly reported violators 
of human rights, with accusations against them including murder, torture, rape, and 
destruction of property (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2003). 
Reminiscent of fundamentalism’s ingroup and outgroup strategy, the racial divide 
began to emerge.  White commercial farmers experienced violent invasion of their farms.  
They were labelled colonialist enemies of the state and of blacks, cheats, and dishonest people 
 
 
uncommitted to the national cause (Alexander, 2004; Meredith, 2003).  In the rural areas, 
ZANU PF youths and war veterans convened meetings where huge crowds sang and danced 
to revolutionary songs in support of ZANU PF.  Those who attended were categorized as 
members of ZANU PF, and those who did not, as opposition members.  In a fundamentalist 
context, members associate with their own and avoid the outgroup.  This segues into the 
politics of inclusion and exclusion, which is a tactic that has been deployed by ZANU PF 
since pre-independence times.  Dissenting voices were simply named and categorized as 
vatengesi (sellouts), a term that was used to describe those who collaborated with the colonial 
Rhodesia Front (RF).  The term also refered to anyone in solidarity with Zimbabwe People’s 
Revolutionary Army or Rhodesian Forces (Dzimiri et al., 2014).  The characteristics of a 
fundamentalist discourse can be identified in the nationalist discourse: creation of boundaries, 
absolutism, divisiveness, and member inclusion and exclusion—particular forms of behaviour 
enforced by institutions, eclecticism, and authoritarianism. 
The state media disseminated propaganda.  It spread messages against the opposition 
MDC, civil society, and non-governmental organizations to further the interests of the ZANU 
PF regime.  Fundamentalist, propagandist, and particularistic messages were repeated in both 
electronic and print media.  The media fueled division and enmity between people and 
solidified negative beliefs and attitudes between those who harbored different political ideas.  
Typical of fundamentalism, people were divided into the good and the bad.  The ruling party 
cadres and enthusiasts labelled those who did not agree with their political ideology enemies 
of the state, allies of western forces, or Western-sponsored traitors seeking a return to white 
rule.  As the people listened to the radio, watched television, and read government controlled 
newspapers they were “informed” about what it means to be a good Zimbabwean and a 
genuine African (Raftopoulos, 2004).  
The Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation launched in 2001 its new mission to 
“provide world class quality programs and services that reflect, develop, foster and respect the 
Zimbabwean national identity, character, cultural diversity, national aspirations and 
Zimbabwean and pan-African values” (Chiumbu, 2004).  Nationalist programs such as 
National Ethos and Nhaka Yedu (our heritage) which were meant to reawaken Zimbabweans 
from colonial nightmare into a more essentialist African consciousness (Raftopolous, 2004) 
were introduced in the state media.  To bolster this strategy, as Tendi (2010) observed, 
Zimbabwean nationalist “public” revisionist intellectuals branded opposition forces as 
western “puppets.”  While the effectiveness of the media on fundamentalist loyalty cannot be 
established mathematically, the presence of ZANU PF messages and jingles in the public 
 
 
sphere, and how the jingles were played at rallies, might be a way to discern the impact of the 
media.  Ordinary party enthusiasts developed their arguments for the party-based 
propagandist information aired on radio and television.  For instance it became common for 
ZANU PF supporters to blame the poor performance of the economy on sanctions imposed on 
Zimbabwe.  This was the argument endlessly aired on radio or television, or written in 
newspapers.  Many voters take what appears in print and electronic media for the truth. 
As has been noted, one of the characteristics of fundamentalism is theological 
innovation whereby a religion in its old format, when challenged by modernity, reinterprets its 
central tenets and ideologies to meet the new challenges.  One method of theological 
innovation is a selective emphasis on doctrines.  ZANU-PF turned to Zimbabwe’s liberation 
story and Zimbabwe’s “golden past.”  It conscripted elements of history which it believed 
would generate support and undermine opposition elements.  Themes and events which did 
not serve ZANU-PF’s agenda were downplayed or misrepresented (Tendi, 2010).  The 
strategy can be demonstrated by the treatment of former vice-president Joice Mujuru.  Since 
independence Mujuru was said to have downed a helicopter with a machine gun on 17 
February 1974.  When she fell out of favour with the ruling regime, history was “re-written.”  
That claim was revoked and said to be a hoax (Staff Reporter, 2014).  The state broadcaster 
stopped using the “comrade” honorific and referred to her simply as “Mrs Mujuru.”  The title 
“comrade” is reserved for those who joined the struggle to end white rule in the 1970s, and 
who remain loyal to the party in general, and President Robert Mugabe in particular 
(Thornycroft, 2015). 
Manifesting another classic tactic of fundamentalists, history curriculum in schools 
began to emphasize the history and pride of Zimbabwe.  Ranger (2003) called it patriotic 
history and has noted its narrowing focus, its resentment of “disloyal” historical questions, its 
antagonism towards academic history, and that it is highly politically charged.  
Instrumentalist nationalism has thus been a form of a fundamentalist religion from a 
functional perspective.  As Gentile posited, “A ‘religion of politics’ is a system of beliefs, 
myths, rituals and symbols that interpret and define the meaning and end of human existence 
by subordinating the destiny of individuals and the collectivity to a supreme entity” (2006, p. 
xiv).  This does not refer to a theocracy where the state subordinates to a traditional religion.  
A religion of politics creates an “aura of sacredness around an entity belonging to this world” 
(Gentile, 2006., p. 76).  This entity might be an individual leader or a political party.  It is of 
two kinds, namely political and civil religion.  Political religion applies to totalitarian regimes, 
such as the Zimbabwean state, during times of threat from mass democracy.  The political 
 
 
system gets sacralized, founded on an unchangeable monopoly of power, ideological monism, 
and the obligatory and unconditional subordination of the individual and the collectivity to its 
code of commandments.  Civil religion is defined as a form of sacralization that guarantees a 
plurality of ideas, free competition in the exercise of power, and the ability of the governed to 
dismiss their governments through peaceful and constitutional means.  The distinction, 
however, is not hermetic (Cavanaugh, 2009, pp. 109-110).  Civil religion can become political 
religion when regimes are under threat, and political religion can be toned down during times 
of less or no threat to the regimes.  As already intimated, the type of the religion in Zimbabwe 
is not civil, but political religion.  While nationalism itself was political religion, the reach 
into traditional religions, especially Christianity and African religion, strengthened its 
fundamentalist character and made the instrumental fundamentalism more conspicuous. 
According to the 2012 census estimate, Zimbabwe has a population of 13 million 
people.  Eighty-four (84) percent of the population is Christian divided as follows: thirty-three 
(33) percent Catholic; forty-two (42) percent evangelical or Pentecostal; seventeen (17) 
percent Anglican, Methodist, or Presbyterian, and eight (8) percent apostolic.  There are a 
significant number of independent Pentecostal and syncretic African churches.  The majority 
of the population also adheres to varying degrees to indigenous religions.  Approximately 
three (3) percent of the population is Muslim—primarily immigrants of Mozambican and 
Malawian descent.  The Muslim population is concentrated in rural areas and in some high-
density suburbs.  Small numbers of Greek Orthodox, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, and the Bahai 
faith make up less than one (1) percent of the population.  Political elites tend to be members 
of established Christian mainstream or Pentecostal churches (U.S. Department of State, 2012). 
As Berger (1967) notes “religion legitimates social institutions by bestowing upon 
them an ultimately valid ontological status, which is locating them within a sacred and cosmic 
frame of reference” (p. 33).  To obey political authority is to be in the right relationship with 
the world of the gods (p. 34).  Society and the cosmos are understood as having a microcosm - 
macrocosm relationship.  The parallel extends to specific roles, understood as mimetic 
reiterations of the cosmic realities which they represent (p. 38).  This helps to maintain the 
status quo.  Religious legitimation involves the transformation of human products, such as 
political parties or leaders, into supra- or non-human products; the humanly made world is 
explained in terms that deny its human social production (p. 89). One of the characteristics of 
fundamentalism as we have observed is absolutism.  Thus transforming human products into 
supra or non-human products is to make them and their decisions and actions absolute.  To 
locate Mugabe within the cosmic frame of reference is to make his decisions and actions and 
 
 
those of ZANU PF ultimate.  To question him would be to question God.  In doing this, 
instrumentalist nationalism becomes a fundamentalism. 
Religious organizations sympathetic to ZANU PF, especially mainline church leaders, 
apex bodies, and African Independent Churches, likened Mugabe to the biblical Moses, who 
delivered people to the Promised Land.  His leadership was depicted as an apocalypse, the 
fulfillment of a divine prophecy.  Bishop Mutendi of the Zion Christian Church remarked that 
Mugabe was greater than the biblical Moses: “You have managed to do what Moses could not 
achieve because Moses did not go with the children of Israel to Canaan, but you were with us 
at independence and you are still with us” (Mawawa, 2016).  Invoking indigenous religion, 
Mugabe was said to be acting in accordance with the demands of the ancestors and obeying 
ancestral oracles when he took the land away from white commercial farmers (Mukonyora, 
2011, p. 137).  
Drawing upon an ideological convergence on Africanness, sovereignty and identity 
with Mugabe and ZANU PF, the African Independenct Churches have legitimated Mugabe as 
a divine leader.  Issues of convergence with the AICs have included criticism of 
homosexuality.  Speaking at a gathering of vapositori, Mugabe invoked the discourse of 
homosexuality: “Homosexuality, sodomy and moral decadence should not be allowed to take 
root in Zimbabwe.  The church must preach against these vices” (Staff Reporter, 2014).  This 
rhetoric serves to mobilize the required votes and in the long term it is part of subject 
formation in which a particular message is transmitted by an authority to create a constituency 
of subjects.  
The AICs share with Mugabe’s regime a totalitarian and fundamentalist tendency 
(Hastings, 1979, p. 77; Machoko, 2013, p. 4).  African churches such as Johane Masowe 
WeChishanu (vapositori) became dependable support bases when ZANU PF’s urban support 
waned (Mukonyora, 2011, p. 137).  They became part of the machinery of nationalism.  In 
one episode Mugabe, a staunch Catholic, even dressed in the vapositori costume as a way of 
identifying with them.  During my field research in 2013, in Zimbabwe, I observed that the 
vapositori have had seats reserved for them at state functions and line up at the airport to 
receive Mugabe on his return from overseas trips.  The treatment granted Mugabe is typical of 
the treatment given to religious fundamentalist leaders.  
The nationalist discourse co-opted some leaders of mainline churches such as Ezekiel 
Guti of ZAOGA, who upheld the notion of African liberation, and Rev. Obadiah Msindo of 
the Destiny for Africa Network, an organization which was fully funded by ZANU PF and 
became its conduit to “sacred power” (Zimudzi, 2006, p. 201).  On the eve of the 2013 
 
 
elections, prophet Wutawunashe, founder and leader of the Family of God Church, endorsed 
President Mugabe’s candidacy, describing him as Zimbabwe’s messiah due to his spirited 
drive to ensure people have total control over their God-given natural resources (Maponga 
2013).  In the same vein Anglican Bishop Jakazi, urged his members to vote for Mugabe: “I 
want to encourage you to vote for ZANU PF.  I am blessing the victory of Mugabe.  I call 
upon people to choose life and consider the future when they vote in the forthcoming 
elections” (Masekesa, 2013). 
The Apostles Christian Council of Zimbabwe (ACCZ), a body with direct monetary 
support from the ZANU PF regime, was created to house and regulate all 350 apostolic and 
Zionist churches in Zimbabwe (Nsingo, 2012).  Former Vice President Joice Mujuru was the 
matron of this body, despite being a member of the Salvation Army, which is not a member of 
the apostolic and Zionist churches.  Typical of fundamentalist tendencies, especially 
theological innovation, when Joice Mujuru fell out with the Mugabe regime, the ACCZ also 
denounced her and a new theology that justified dropping her as the matron was developed.  
The leader of ACCZ Bishop Johannes Ndanga stated: 
The patron’s appointment is done to someone who will be representing the president 
because he is the one who the Holy Spirit through Johanne Masowe in 1934 said will 
lead the nation.  When former VP was the patron, she was representing President 
Mugabe, so it is now impossible for her to remain as our patron. (Religion in 
Zimbabwe, 2014) 
In the whole saga leading to her dismissal, Mugabe had accused Mujuru of witchcraft, a 
practice which is a gross aberration from Christian principles and practice: 
We managed to know what Mai (Mrs.) Mujuru was doing at her house, even 
consulting n’angas (traditional healers).  Recently she invited two Nigerian sangomas.  
We heard they were specialists in the field of witchcraft. (Zimbabwe News, 2015)  
While Mujuru’s religious background is something to reckon with, her association with 
ZANU PF at the highest level, the Presidium, as Vice President of ZANU PF and of 
Zimbabwe, still haunts and taints her reputation as an alternative candidate and pillar of hope 
for Zimbabwe. 
To put the discussion into perspective, it must be not be overlooked that religious 
organizations also have the potential to deploy religion to challenge the system rather than 
subjecting citizens.  Groups such as the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance and Churches in 
Manicaland represent religio-political groups that have challenged the government in post-
colonial Zimbabwe (Tarusarira, 2016).  In the second half of 2016, Zimbabwe witnessed a 
 
 
notable development when Pastor Evan Mawarire started a popular movement, “#ThisFlag,” 
which challenged the government of President Robert Mugabe to deliver the promises it made 
in the 2013 election.  It was not difficult for Mawarire’s movement to spread as it rode on the 
back of the national discontent regarding the economic meltdown the country was, and is still, 
experiencing.  The #ThisFlag movement joined forces with citizen groups and effected a 
national shut down on 6 July 2016 through the use of social media, especially Facebook.  
Mugabe’s regime descended on Mawarire, but failed to trump up treason charges against him.  
He thus fled to South Africa and subsequently to the United States of America.  One ZANU-
PF functionary and Member of Parliament denounced him in a slogan, saying, “Down with 
Mawarire! Down with those who read the Bible upside down!” (Rupiah, 2016).  This violent 
response by the government to religious organizations critical of it, threaten peace and 
reconciliation in Zimbabwe.  However, the emergence of such organizations provide a 
window of hope.  Following Mawarire’s #ThisFlag, organizations such as 
Tajamuka/Sesijikile and other citizens groups emerged and staged protests and 
demonstrations.  The protests shook the government such that it banned protests for certain 
periods by invoking the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) (Mhofu, 2016).  Demonstrated 
is the strategic potential for religious and non-religious groups to join and confront ZANU 
PF’s instrumental nationalism. 
Fundamentalism is characterized by an emphasis on one center of power.  Witnessed 
is the effort to make Mugabe the center of power and authority.  At the human level, he is the 
visible Supreme Being in the order of divinity.  It is no wonder that top musician Alick 
Macheso, when invited to perform at a state event, had the opportunity to get a handshake 
from Robert Mugabe.  He went down on his knees, bowed down, his head touching the 
ground, when he raised his head, tears could be seen running down his cheeks (Showbiz 
Reporter, 2012).  Those who have been expelled from the party in the factional fights linked 
to the succession debate within ZANU PF, left the party singing praises for Mugabe and the 
party.  None of them, including the former Vice President Joice Mujuru, have uttered any 
word against Mugabe, but only praise.  While some might attribute that to fear, this article 
argues that it is instead a sense of passionate attachment with Mugabe and the party.  
The so-called one million man march in May 2016, in support of 92 year old Mugabe 
as the party’s Presidential candidate in 2018, was organized by the youths and also exposed 
how the majority of its supporters are poverty-stricken, especially those in the rural areas, but 
continue to support Mugabe and ZANU PF.  The one million man march gobbled an 
estimated $600,000 (USD) at a time when hospitals are dilapidated and without drugs.  After 
 
 
the march some of the party enthusiasts were left stranded in the cold with no transport to take 
them to their homes.  Hordes of hungry and desperate party followers were seen milling 
around dejectedly after being left on their own (Mashaya & Kamhungira, 2016)—an event 
that happens repeatedly after ZANU PF rallies.  With this treatment one wonders what in the 
first place prompted them to go to the march.  It is not the abandonment and ill-treatment with 
which I argue that these participants willingly went to the rallies, but that the effervescence 
observed during the marches and rallies makes it difficult to think the participants were forced 
to attend.  This  challenges the received orthodoxy that well-written manifestos, also called 
programmatic agendas, are the key to mobilizing political support.  When political parties 
appeared, they were based on ideology or programmatic agendas (Fukuyama, 2014).  In the 
election of 2013, ZANU PF had a well-promoted economic blue print, called 
Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Government of 
Zimbabwe, 2013) which was meant to turn around the fortunes of the economy—the most 
referenced promise being the creation of two million jobs.  During the one-million man 
march, Zimbabwe was experiencing a liquidity crunch, and about 100 000 jobs had instead 
been lost since the 2013 election, according to Former Finance Minister Tendai Biti (New 
Zimbabwe, 2016).  Despite that, thousands turned up for the march.   
Instrumentalist Nationalism as a Fundamentalist Discourse 
The discourse of rituals in politics can help us further understand how instrumentalist 
nationalism is fundamentalist in Zimbabwe.  Applying this concept helps to show how the 
process of subject formation is undertaken.  Rituals are defined as symbolic behavior that is 
socially standardized and repetitive (Kertzer, 1988, p. 9).  Through rituals, politicians try to 
assert, and sometimes make divine, their right and authority to rule as well as carve out a new 
basis of political allegiance.  Rituals provide a way to understand what is going on in the 
world that must be drastically simplified if it is to be understood (Kertzer, 1988, p. 9).  When 
ZANU PF was at its lowest, as from 2000 to the present, it simplified its instrumentalist 
nationalism mantra through propagandist and particularistic media jingles that were repeated 
over and over in both electronic and print media.  This impression was so impactful that it 
seems to have penetrated into the minds of the people, whom we observe dedicating their time 
and energy for ZANU PF activities and making the propagandist rhetoric their basis of 
arguments in defense of their political party.  The messages were crafted so as to subject a 
people, create a particular mood in the country, and influence an attachment with the ruling 
regime.  Messages meant to “help Zimbabweans understand what was going on in the world” 
included The land is the economy and the economy is the land; Zimbabwe will never be a 
 
 
colony again; Our land is our prosperity; Third Chimurenga; Chave Chimurenga (It’s now 
war), amongst others.  An estimate made in 2003 for one music jingle titled Chave 
Chimurenga showed that it was being played approximately 288 times a day on the four 
national radio stations, which amounts to 8,640 times per month.  It was aired on television 
approximately 72 times a day, which amounts to 2,160 times a month (Sibanda, 2005).  Social 
science tells us that repetition of propaganda can be devastatingly effective (Chikwanha, 
Sithole, & Bratton, 2004).  
Fundamentalism is related to members associating with their own and avoiding 
outsiders.  To ensure adherance, groups may develop particular modes of dress, behaviour, 
and speech, which are enforced in their communities sometimes violently, as noted 
previously.  ZANU PF developed new campaign material in various forms—shirts, skirts, t-
shirts, and flags.  As my observation, during the election of 2008 and 2013, it became 
common to keep a small Zimbabwean flag which got conflated with the ZANU PF flag, due 
to their similar colours, for purposes of safety.  With that flag one would be shielded from 
attack by ZANU PF enthusiasts.  Thus, national and ZANU PF symbols got conflated.  At 
police roadblocks, suspicion of belonging to the opposition was highly expected if one’s car 
did not have a hanging Zimbabwean or ZANU PF flag. 
In terms of speech, there were slogans associated with the party and its President.  One 
was expected to be conversant with these, and failure would intimate that one belonged to the 
opposition.  ZANU PF’s culture of slogans derives from the liberation war and as Hove 
(2013) points out: 
Liberation-war guerrillas were masters of sloganeering.  The so-called pungwes or all-
night political education meetings in the mountains were nothing more than chains of 
slogans, extolling the unproven virtues of Zanu.  They were also used as a prelude to 
the cold-blooded murders of those condemned by Zanu kangaroo courts as witches, 
sellouts and political opponents.  
 
Invariable and repeated wearing and carrying of party regalia ensured that the party 
ideology and identity slowly sunk into individuals before their realization they would be 
victims of subject formation, with a passionate attachment even to their source of domination.  
In repeating these gestures, the masses found themselves in what Butler (1988) called 
performativity, meaning they performed and internalized the identities imposed by ZANU PF 
until it became their second nature or lived subjectivity (pp. 204-205).  The materials were 
accompanied by rallies and galas whose rationale derived from the pungwes.  Galas and 
 
 
musical bashes were organized on significant days such as the Independence Day, the heroes 
and defense forces days, as well as days in honor of the late ZANU PF heroes.  The type of 
music, language and themes were linked to the ruling regime.  Thus musicians sympathetic to 
the regime were invited to perform.  
Music is not solely a tool of social entertainment.  As Koelsch (2010) has noted, music 
has an inherent ability to evoke powerful emotional responses in listeners (p. 131).  
Baumgartner,Lutz, Schmidt, and Jancke (2006) observed that evoked emotions impact and 
enhance the subjective experience of other sensory stimuli (p. 151) and more closely, music 
releases oxytocin, and research has shown that oxytocin is critical to generation of trust and 
affiliation (Missig, Ayers, Schulkin, & Rosen, 2010, pp. 2607-2016).  The preceding renders 
music a powerful social tool.  No wonder musicologist Cross (2003) asserts that “music is not 
only sonic, embodied and interactive; it is bound to its contexts of occurrence in ways that 
enable it to derive meaning from, and interactively confer meaning on, the experiential 
contexts in which it occurs” (p. 108).  Music elicits inexplicable emotions of joy, awe and 
ecstasy, while increasing trust, empathy and cooperation among participants.  In the case of 
ZANU PF, nationalist listeners would elicit inexplicable emotions toward, and increase trust, 
emphathy and cooperation with, ZANU PF.  It is not surprising that composing party songs 
became one of the key strategies employed by ZANU PF’s political commissars.  In 2001, the 
late ZANU PF’s national commissar and elections director Elliot Manyika recorded the album 
Mwana Wevhu (Son of the Soil) in which he sang the lead vocals on the “hit” song Nora, a 
praise song for Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe.  He also composed an eight track 
called Zimbabwe 2005 for ZANU PF’s election campaign.  Some of his songs celebrated 
Black independence, while in others, the MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai is accused of selling 
out to the former colonial power, Britain (Sibanda, 2005).  Webster Shamu, ZANU PF’s 
political commissar, also recorded a CD Nyatsoterera (listen carefully) that he composed with 
a group called Mbare Chimurenga choir (Sibanda, 2008).  It has become a tradition to belt out 
this music at political rallies. 
The deployment of songs in the political discourse derives from the colonial times.  
Chikowore (2015) observes that during the colonial era, Africans deployed songs as cultural 
expressions to fight war over their being, to regenerate their selfhoods, and to strive for 
liberation from the confinements of subjugation.  These songs, as Chikowore (2015) notes, 
emerged from the village and urban-class African consciousness.  It is therefore not surprising 




Music embedded in religious rituals transforms the ordinary into the extraordinary, 
thereby laying the foundation for the creation of the sacred.  No wonder religious songs have 
been imported into the political discourse in Zimbabwe (Chitando, 2002).  The deployment of 
music through musical galas and musical jingles is not for mere entertainment, but is a central 
part of the fundamentalist nationalist project of ZANU PF.  It creates a fundamentalist mind, 
and the articulated impact of music dovetails with the characteristics of fundamentalism.  All 
these fundamentalist initiatives had emotional and psychological functions, an aspect that is 
under-researched.  Thus huge loud speakers that belt out nationalistic music have become a 
common feature of ZANU PF’s political rituals.  To this music dance ordinary people, with 
little to gain from the political discourse. 
Those deploying political rituals capitalize on the fact that politics is not merely about 
material interest, but also producing and using symbols.  Kertzer (1988) stated, “It is through 
symbols that people give meaning to their lives; gain full understanding of political 
allegiances.  The power of the ritual stems from its psychological underpinnings.  A ritual also 
serves to link the individual to society” (p. 10).  To understand how the various activities 
described above, undertaken by the ZANU PF, are fundamentalist and subsequently tools for 
subject formation, we need to understand participation in rituals.  Creating the right protocol, 
behaviors, sitting arrangements, speeches, song, dance, and dressing (think campaign regalia) 
in everyday politics at rallies and musical bashes, “involves physiological stimuli, the arousal 
of emotions; rituals work through the senses to structure our sense of reality and our 
understanding of the world around us” (p. 10).  
Furthermore the psychological attributes of ritual are evident in a frequently dramatic 
character.  Ritual provokes emotional response, thereby prompting people to do things they 
never thought they could do, or to develop a particular fixed position or disposition about 
certain issues, as well as being ready to act in certain ways they would otherwise not do had 
they not been part of the ritual (Kertzer, 1988, p. 10).  Fundamentalists are clear about the 
enemy.  There is no compromise and their mission regarding the enemy is simply to eliminate 
the enemy who is the incarnation of the devil.  The various nationalistic activities have 
created a sectarian understanding of the nation Zimbabwe that is not shared by all 
Zimbabweans, but one that serves a particular section of society and consequently results in 
conflict and violence in the country.  It has created a people that act in ways that are divisive.  
The case of the aforementioned National Youth Service graduates who underwent 
fundamentalist training at youth training camps and  then perpetrated violence in support of 
ZANU PF, proves the point.   
 
 
Instrumentalist nationalism in the case of Zimbabwe is meant to link the individual 
with the society or community that is created or imagined (Anderson, 1991) by ZANU PF 
through its nationalism project.  Some may consider patriotism a virture, but the problem lies 
in that the love and commitment for country in Zimbabwe has been conflated with the love 
and commitment for ZANU PF.  Differently put, patriotism has been conflated with 
nationalism, and yet the two are distinct.  The nationalist discourse is presented under the 
guise of patriotism; yet these discourses are driven by different socio-psychological processes.  
Patriotism refers to the noncompetitive love of and commitment to one’s country.  It focuses 
on promoting the welfare of one’s nation, but is neutral with regard to the evaluation of 
others.  Nationalism on the other hand is related to the superiority of the ingroup over 
outgroups and implies the exclusion or even domination of outgroups.  Consequently it is 
associated with higher levels of chauvinism, prejudice, militarization, hawkish attitudes, 
social dominance orientation, and lower levels of internationalization (Kemmelmeier & 
Winter, 2008, p. 863).  The preceding narrative on instrumentalist nationalism attests to that.  
Experiments have shown that when exposed to nationalistic symbols, individuals are likely to 
think and act in ways consistent with the worldviews and values with which the symbols are 
associated (Kemmelmeier & Winter, 2008).  Thus exposure to ZANU PF’s symbols is 
expected to form subjects who think and act in ways consistent with ZANU PF’s worldviews 
and values.  
Conclusion 
Against this background, it can be argued that there still exist people who 
enthusiastically, passionately, and emotionally support ZANU PF and its leader, Robert 
Mugabe.  This is contrary to the view of much of the literature on political practice in 
Zimbabwe—that the many people observed as effervescent at ZANU PF’s marches and rallies 
are forced to attend, or are lured with benefits such as food handouts (Kriger, 2005).  I have 
used the concepts of subject formation and fundamentalism here to offer a new explanation 
often overlooked in discussing politics in Zimbabwe, thus making a new contribution to the 
discourse and literature of political mobilization.  ZANU PF supporters have developed a 
passionate attachment to the system and its leader.  To attribute this support only to the carrot 
and stick method in the form of rented crowds, food handouts, coercion, and persuasive 
election manifestos is inadequate because in some cases these have been non-existent.  As I 
have argued, some allegiances have not shifted.  This was demonstrated by some participants 
of the one million march in support of Robert Mugabe, who were left stranded after the event.  
As for the election manifestos, the blue print ZimAsset promised 2.2 million jobs, but instead 
 
 
people lost jobs.  Thus, while there are pull and push factors, there is also enthusiastic and 
passionate following without gaining anything from the process.  In this article I have argued 
that instrumental nationalism—thanks to its fundamentalist character with its subject 
formation potential—provides an explanation, in part.  The Zimbabwean context as discussed 
above has resulted in conflict and violence, which engender the need for peace and 
reconciliation.  The accentuation of the psychological dimension, exemplified by the 
fundamantalist mind, indicates that people act quickly and decisively on the basis of their 
emotions, beliefs, and attitudes more than they do on rational reasons presented in favour of a 
particular position.  To facilitate sustainable peace and reconciliation, the psychological 
repertoires need to be given serious consideration.  For the most part, conflict transformation 
and peacebuilding processes have been dominated by liberalism, which tends to put emphasis 
on rationality and detailed treatise at the expense of the workings of conflictants’ beliefs, 
emotions, and attitudes.  In practical terms, this means that psychosocial methods should be 
prioritized to facilitate change of minds and hearts, which are fundamental for sustainable 
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